This paper systematically examines the interrelations between a progressive income tax schedule and macroeconomic (in)stability in an otherwise standard one-sector real business model with productive government spending. We analytically show that the economy exhibits indeterminacy and sunspots only if the equilibrium wage-hours locus is positively sloped and steeper than the household's labor supply curve. Unlike in the framework with useless public expenditures, a less progressive tax policy may operate like an automatic stabilizer that mitigates belief-driven cyclical ‡uctuations. Our quantitative analysis shows that this result is able to provide a theoretically plausible explanation for the discernible reduction in U.S. output volatility after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was implemented.
Introduction
Traditional Keynesian macroeconomics stipulates that progressive income taxation is an automatic stabilizer in mitigating the magnitude of ‡uctuations in disposable income and consumption. It follows that ceteris paribus the cyclical volatility of output is smaller when the economy is subject to a more progressive tax policy. As it turns out, this result continues to hold in the context of one-sector real business cycle (RBC) models. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) show that standard one-sector RBC models with a constant returns-to-scale production technology may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspots under a balanced-budget rule where …xed public expenditures are …nanced by proportional taxation on labor or total income. Therefore, when agents'optimism leads to higher investment and hours worked, the government is forced to lower the tax rates as total output rises. This countercyclical …scal formulation is qualitatively equivalent to regressive income taxation. By contrast, Guo and Lansing (1998) incorporate a progressive income tax schedule, whereby the household's marginal tax rate is increasing in its own level of taxable income, into Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) indeterminate one-sector no-sustained-growth RBC model with aggregate increasing returns-to-scale in production. These authors …nd that a su¢ ciently strong tax progressivity can stabilize the economy against business cycle ‡uctuations driven by agents'animal spirits. 1 In the above-referenced work and other related previous studies, government purchases are postulated to generate no substitution e¤ects in that they do not a¤ect the marginal conditions for the household's consumption/savings or the …rm's production decisions. However, the assumption of wasteful or useless public spending, although commonly adopted in the academic literature for analytical simplicity, is not necessarily the most realistic -at least for developed countries. In this paper, we systematically explore the stability e¤ects of Guo and Lansing's (1998) progressive tax formulation in an otherwise standard one-sector RBC model with indivisible labor and productive public expenditures. Speci…cally, as in Barro (1990) , government spending enters the …rm's Cobb-Douglas production technology as an input that is complementary to private capital and labor services.
Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that the interrelations between the government's tax policy rule and macroeconomic (in)stability depend crucially on (i) the labor share of national income, (ii) the degree of positive external e¤ects that public spending exerts on the …rm's production process, (iii) the level parameter of the tax schedule, which also governs the government size measured by the steady-state ratio of government purchases to GDP, and (iv) the slope parameter of the tax schedule that characterizes its progressivity feature.
In particular, we …rst derive the analytical expression of the model's Jacobian matrix, and show that the necessary condition for our model economy to exhibit local indeterminacy is an upward-sloping equilibrium wage-hours locus which is steeper than the labor supply curve.
It follows that endogenous belief-driven macroeconomic booms and downturns may occur as self-ful…lling equilibria. This turns out to be the same (necessary and su¢ cient) condition for indeterminacy and sunspot in Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) laissez-faire one-sector RBC model with a social technology that displays increasing returns in private capital and labor inputs.
Next, within the empirically plausible speci…cation that capital's share of output is lower than that of labor, a comprehensive graphical investigation is undertaken to illustrate our model's local stability properties. Speci…cally, we are able to clearly divide the feasible parameter space into the regions of "saddle", "sink" and "source" under three di¤erent con…g-urations. In the benchmark parameterization, the steady-state public expenditures to GDP ratio is postulated to be lower than the capital share of national income, which in turn is smaller than the level parameter of the tax scheme. In sharp contrast to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1998) with useless government purchases, raising the tax progressivity may turn our model's steady state from a saddle point to a sink provided public spending is su¢ ciently productive. This implies that a more progressive tax schedule can destabilize the economy by causing endogenous cyclical ‡uctuations. On the contrary, as in the existing studies, more progressive income taxation works like an automatic stabilizer within the other two parametric formulations. In these frameworks, the economy is more susceptible to equilibrium indeterminacy when the tax policy rule becomes ‡atter. Moreover, some recent …ndings in the RBC-based indeterminacy literature, such as those in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and Harrison (2004, 2008) , can be shown as special cases of our analytical and graphical results.
To obtain further insights, we carry out a quantitative analysis of macroeconomic (in)stability within a calibrated version of our model economy. Our benchmark calibration, which is consistent with post-war U.S. data, turns out to be the empirically relevant formulation. With regard to calibrating the level and slope parameters of our postulated tax policy, we follow period. These estimations result in an average R-square of 0:867. We …nd that the estimated tax-level parameter displayed a slow downward trend during the 1966 1986 sub-sample period and remained stable after 1987; and that the average values of this parameter turn out to be very similar across the two subperiods. In addition, our estimated tax-slope parameter exhibits a discernible structural break because of the implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA-86). In particular, the U.S. tax code was more progressive prior to TRA-86, evidenced by the signi…cant decrease of estimated progressivity between 1986 and 1987; and the average level of estimated tax progressivity has also shown a noticeable declining trend. 
The Economy
We incorporate productive government purchases into a prototypical one-sector real business cycle (RBC) model under an income tax policy a la Guo and Lansing (1998) . Households live forever, and derive utility from consumption and leisure. On the production side, each competitive …rm produces output with a Cobb-Douglas technology that uses capital, labor and public spending as inputs. We assume that there are no fundamental uncertainties present in the economy.
Firms
There is a continuum of identical competitive …rms, with the total number normalized to one.
Each …rm produces output Y t , using capital K t , labor hours H t and aggregate government spending G t as complementary inputs, with the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 3
Notice that the technology (1) exhibits constant returns-to-scale with respect to private capital and labor inputs; and captures the degree of positive external e¤ects that public expenditures exert on the …rm's production process. Moreover, we assume that < 1 to rule out the possibility of sustained endogenous growth. Under the assumption that factor markets are perfectly competitive, the representative …rm takes G t as given and maximize its pro…ts according to
where r t is the rental rate of capital and w t is the real wage. In addition, and 1 represent the capital and labor share of national income, respectively.
Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical in…nitely-lived households. Each household is endowed with one unit of time and maximizes
where > 0 is the subjective discount rate, and C t and H t are the individual household's consumption and hours worked, respectively. The linearity of (4) in hours worked draws on the formulation of indivisible labor (Hansen, 1985; and Rogerson, 1988 ) that is commonly adopted in the RBC-based indeterminacy literature. 4 The budget constraint faced by the representative household is given by
3 As in Barro (1990) , Gt represents the ‡ow of productive services that government spending yields. Alternatively, Gt can be interpreted as the stock of public capital with a depreciation rate of 100%. Allowing for partial depreciation of public capital will introduce another state variable to the model's dynamical system. This is an extension that is worth pursuing in future research. 4 See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for an excellent survey of this literature.
where K t is the household's capital stock and 2 (0; 1) is the capital depreciation rate.
Households derive income by supplying capital and labor services to …rms, taking factor prices r t and w t as given. As in Guo and Lansing (1998), we postulate that the income tax rate t takes the form
where Y t = r t K t +w t L t represents the household's taxable income, and Y denotes the steadystate level of per capita income, which is taken as given by each agent. The parameters and govern the level and slope of the tax schedule, respectively. When > (<) 0, the tax rate t increases (decreases) with the household's taxable income Y t . When = 0, all households face the constant tax rate 1 regardless of their taxable income.
Using (6), we obtain the expression for the marginal tax rate of income mt , which is de…ned as the change in taxes paid by the household divided by the change in its taxable income, as follows:
In this paper, our analyses are restricted to environments in which the government does not have access to lump-sum taxes or transfers, hence t > 0 and mt > 0 are imposed. We also require t < 1 to ensure that the government can not con…scate all productive resources, and mt < 1 so that households have an incentive to provide labor and capital services to …rms. Finally, to guarantee the existence of an interior steady state, the economy's equilibrium after-tax interest rate (1 mt ) r t must be a strictly decreasing function of K t ; which imposes another lower bound on mt . In the steady state, the above considerations imply that 2 (0; 1) and < 1. Moreover, the minimum possible level of is determined by the more restrictive lower-bound on the steady-state marginal income tax rate m , hence
Given these restrictions on and , it is straightforward to show that when > 0, the marginal tax rate is higher than the average tax rate given by (6) . In this case, the tax schedule is said to be "progressive". When = 0, the average and marginal tax rates coincide at the level of 1 , thus the tax schedule is " ‡at". When < 0, the tax schedule is said to be "regressive".
Households take into account the way in which the tax schedule a¤ects their earnings when they decide how much to work, consume and invest over their lifetimes. Consequently, it is the marginal tax rate of income that governs the household's economic decisions. The …rst-order conditions for the representative household with respect to the indicated variables and the associated transversality condition (TVC) are
(10)
TVC : lim
where t is the the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint (5), (10) equates the slope of the household's indi¤erence curve to the after-tax real wage, (11) is the consumption Euler equation, and (12) is the transversality condition.
Government
The government sets the tax rate t according to (6) , and balances its budget each period.
Hence, its period budget constraint is given by
where government spending on goods and services G t in turn contributes to the …rms' production. With the government, the aggregate resource constraint for the economy is
3 Macroeconomic (In)stability
This section examines the local stability properties of competitive equilibria in the above model. First, we analytically derive the conditions under which the economy exhibits equilibrium (in)determinacy. Next, we undertake a systematic and comprehensive graphical analysis of our model's local dynamics. Finally, we point out that our theoretical results subsume some recent …ndings in the RBC-based indeterminacy literature as special cases.
Analytical Characterizations
To facilitate the analysis of the model's local stability properties, we make the following logarithmic transformation of variables: k t log(K t ) and c t log(C t ). It is straightforward to show that our model exhibits a unique interior steady state given by
and c = log A (1 )
where
The remaining endogenous variables at the economy's steady state can then be derived accordingly. Next, in the neighborhood of this steady state, the model's equilibrium conditions can be approximated by the following log-linear dynamical system:
(1 )
and is the steady-state level of the average income tax rate. It follows that the determinant and trace of the model's Jacobian matrix J are
and
5 [1 (1 )] > 0 is ensured by the lower bound of given by (8) . 6 See the Appendix for the proof of < 0.
Since the …rst-order dynamical system (17) possesses one predetermined variable k t , the economy displays saddle-path stability and equilibrium uniqueness if and only if the two eigenvalues of J are of opposite sign (Det < 0). When both eigenvalues have negative real parts (Det > 0 and T r < 0), the steady state is a locally indeterminate sink that can be exploited to generate endogenous business cycle ‡uctuations driven by agents'self-ful…lling expectations or sunspots. The steady state becomes a source when both eigenvalues have positive real parts (Det > 0 and T r > 0). In this case, any trajectory that diverges away from the completely unstable steady state may settle down to a limit cycle or to some more complicated attracting sets.
Given 0 < ; < 1; x 1 ; x 2 ; (1 ) > 0 and < 0, the Jacobian's determinant (19) is positive when < 0, i.e.
This in turn constitutes a necessary condition for the steady state to be a sink as the positive determinant only guarantees that both eigenvalues have the same sign. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for local indeterminacy also require the Jacobian's trace (21) to be negative. In particular, when condition (23) is satis…ed, the model's Jacobian matrix exhibits a negative/positive trace (thus the resulting steady state is a sink/source) if its numerator (22) is positive/negative. When the inequality in (23) does not hold, the determinant of J (19) becomes negative, hence the economy's steady state is a (locally determinate) saddle point.
The intuition for above (in)determinacy result can be understood as follows. Substituting
(1) and (13) into the logarithmic version of the labor-market equilibrium condition (10) yields that the slope of the aggregate labor demand schedule is given by Therefore, the condition that is necessarily needed to generate indeterminacy and sunspots in our model with productive government spending and progressive income taxation, as in (23), states that the equilibrium wage-hours locus is upward sloping and steeper than the labor supply curve. This turns out to be exactly the same (necessary and su¢ cient) condition for equilibrium indeterminacy in Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) laissez-faire one-sector RBC model with aggregate increasing returns-to-scale in production due to positive capital/labor externalities or monopolistic competition. In the context of our model economy, if the external impact of government purchases on the …rm's production process together with the level and slope e¤ects of the postulated tax policy are strong enough to make the equilibrium wage-hours locus intersect the household's labor supply curve from below, a positive sunspot shock will lead to simultaneous expansions in GDP, consumption, investment, hours worked and labor productivity. Consequently, agent's initial optimistic expectations about the economy's future become self-ful…lling in equilibrium.
Graphical Characterizations
Given the preceding analytical results, this subsection graphically examines the economy's local dynamics under di¤erent parameter con…gurations. Based on the empirical evidence that capital income accounts for a smaller percentage of GDP than labor income, our analyses are restricted to the speci…cations in which < 1
. 7 The level parameter of the tax schedule is used to characterize the model's feasible parameter regions as well.
3.2.1 When < and 1 < < 1
In this case, the most-binding constraint on turns out to be a positive steady-state marginal tax rate of income, thus = 1 . Figure 1 plots the combinations of (the tax progressivity) and (the output elasticity of government spending) that lead to equilibrium (in)determinacy.
The area above the downward-sloping curve = 0 is ruled out because it violates condition (20) . Moreover, the negatively-sloped locus = 0, given by (18) , divides the regions labeled "saddle"(Det < 0) and "sink"(Det > 0 and T r < 0). 8 It can also be shown that the model's steady state cannot be a source, since it requires < 1 , which is lower than the relevant mentioned above. In sharp contrast to existing studies (e.g. Guo and Lansing, 1998; and Christiano and Harrison, 1999) with wasteful public expenditures, the arrows in Figure 1 demonstrate that when 1 < < 1 , raising the tax progressivity eventually transforms the steady state from a saddle point into a sink. This implies that a more progressive tax schedule may destabilize the economy provided government purchases are su¢ ciently productive. By contrast, saddle-path stability and equilibrium uniqueness always prevail when 0 1 .
When < and < 1 < 1
As in the previous case, the most-binding constraint on is m > 0, hence = 1 . Figure   2 shows that points below the locus = 0 are feasible as they satisfy condition (20) , and 7 For the sake of theoretical completeness, we have also studied the cases in which > 1 . It turns out that the Jacobian's determinant (19) is negative under all feasible parameter combinations. Hence, the economy always exhibits saddle-path stability and equilibrium uniqueness in this setting. These results are available upon request. 8 It can be shown that that the area below the positively-sloped curve = 0 is the "saddle"region (Det < 0). Next, we derive the downward-sloping N um = 0, as in (22) , that separates the zones of "sink"
(Det > 0 and T r < 0) and "source" (Det > 0 and T r > 0). 9 Figure 2 also illustrates that for a given positive level of 2 (0; 1 ), the model's local stability property switches from being a source to a sink, and then to a saddle point as the tax progressivity increases. Therefore, the economy is more susceptible to indeterminacy and sunspots when the tax scheme becomes ‡atter or less progressive (smaller ). On the other hand, saddle-path stability cannot occur if 1 < 1 because the steady state is either a sink or a source. It follows that within this particular parameter space, changing the tax progressivity will not eliminate the possibility of belief-driven business cycle ‡uctuations.
When
In this case, the most-binding constraint on is that the steady-state after-tax interest rate is monotonically decreasing in capital, thus =
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) . Substituting = 0 into this expression yields that > 1 , which is depicted on the horizontal axis of Figure 3 . From this …gure, we see that the regions of "saddle", "sink" and "source" are separated by the dividing loci of = 0, below which condition (20) holds; = 0, below which the determinant of J (19) is negative; and N um = 0, below which the numerator of the Jacobian's trace (22) is positive. 10 Moreover, for all feasible values of 2 [0; 1 ), progressive income taxation works like an automatic stabilizer in that a higher changes the model's steady state from a sink/source to a saddle point.
Special Cases
Our analysis allows for a rich set of theoretical possibilities regarding the interrelations be- Moreover, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) …nd that standard one-sector real business cycle models with a constant returns-to-scale production technology may exhibit local indeterminacy under a balanced-budget rule where …xed pubic expenditures are …nanced by proportional taxation on labor or total income. With this type of balanced-budget formulation, the government is forced to lower the tax rates as total output rises. This setting is qualitatively similar to our model with non-productive public expenditure ( = 0) and regressive income taxation ( < 0). The horizontal axes in Figures 2 and 3 con…rm Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe's (1997) general point that a more regressive tax policy is destablizing the economy because the steady state changes from being a saddle point to a source as the tax progressivity falls. 11 However, the same result does not hold in Figure 1 since saddle-path stability always prevails when = 0.
Finally, when = = 0, our model collapses to one with wasteful government purchases and a constant income tax rate, as in Guo and Harrison (2004) . In this case, it is straightforward to show that the Jacobian's determinant (19) is negative, thus the eigenvalues of the log-linear dynamical system (17) are of opposite sign. It follows that the steady state is a saddle point, as can be seen at the origins of Figures 1 3. 
Quantitative Analysis
To obtain further insights of the above analytical and graphical results, this section undertakes a quantitative investigation of macroeconomic (in)stability within a calibrated version of our model economy. We are particularly interested in studying how tax policies a¤ect the local stability properties of equilibria for combinations of parameters whose values are consistent with the post-war U.S. data. As is common in the real business cycle literature, the capital share of national income, , is chosen to be 0:3; and the steady-state ratio of public expenditures to GDP (or the government size) is set equal to 20%, that is, , which in turn leads to a positive trace (21) . As a result, the steady state is either a saddle point or a source along the horizontal axes of Figures 2 and 3 . and 1
< < 1
. Next, existing empirical estimates of the output elasticity of government spending, , exhibit a wide range from 0:03 (Eberts, 1986) to 0:39 (Aschauer, 1989).
We adopt Li and Sarte's (2004) calibration and set = 0:25 as a "consensus" benchmark.
Substituting these parameter values into (23), the critical value of the tax progressivity that satis…es = 0 and separates the regions of "saddle" and "sink" in Figure 1 is c = 0:1667.
In what follows, we examine whether the U.S. tax schedule has been more or less progressive than this threshold level, and then discuss the associated business-cycle implications.
The U.S. federal individual income tax schedule is progressive since it is characterized by several tax "brackets" (branches of income) that are taxed at progressively higher rates.
For example, Figure 4 shows that there were …fteen marginal tax rates, ranging from zero to 50%, in 1986. Subsequently, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA-86) simpli…ed the tax code and reduced the number of marginal tax rates to …ve in 1987, as shown in Figure 5 .
In addition, the top tax rate was lowered from 50% to 38:5%, whereas the bottom rate was raised from zero to 11%. These marginal tax rates can be used to construct the average tax schedules, which are also depicted in the …gures. 1213 In terms of calibrating the tax-schedule parameters and according to (6) Yt to an income ratio that is de…ned as the inverse of the household's taxable income divided by its mean level. Moreover, the mean level of taxable income for married taxpayers who …led joint returns is adopted to represent Y . 14 Using 1; 000 data points with equal increments in taxable income, we carry out a year-by-year nonlinear least squares regression of the average tax rate t on the corresponding income ratio 
Conclusion
This paper has systematically explored the relationships between progressive income taxation and equilibrium (in)determinacy in a prototypical one-sector real business cycle model with productive government purchases. We analytically …nd that the economy exhibits an indeterminate steady state and thus a continuum of stationary sunspot equilibria only if the equilibrium wage-hours locus is upward sloping and intersects the household's labor supply curve from below. When the steady-state ratio of public spending to GDP is lower than the capital share of national income, which in turn is smaller than the level parameter of the tax schedule, a less progressive tax policy may stabilize the economy against business cycle ‡uctuations driven by changes in agents' non-fundamental expectations. Our quantitative analysis shows that this result is able to provide a theoretically plausible explanation for the moderation of U.S. output volatility after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 signi…cantly reduced its tax progressivity. Guo and Harrison (2001) show that a regressive tax schedule is needed to eliminate indeterminacy and sunspots, and that this economy with ‡at or progressive income taxation is more susceptible to belief-driven aggregate ‡uctuations. It would be worthwhile to examine the robustness of our results within a two-sector RBC framework. The abovementioned extensions will further enhance our understanding of the qualitative and quantitative interrelations between a progressive/regressive tax policy and macroeconomic (in)stability in representative-agent models with useful public expenditures. We plan to pursue these research projects in the future.
Appendix
Proof of < 0: First, after substituting the tax schedule (6) and the government budget constraint (13) into the …rm's production function (1), and then taking total di¤erentiation, we obtain the output elasticities of capital and labor for the reduced-form social technology as follows: 
